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Abstract 
In this paper we attempt to analyse whether price-based controls on capital 
inflows are successful in insulating economies against external shocks. We 
present results from VAR models that indicate that Chile and Colombia, countries 
that adopted controls on capital inflows, seem to have been relatively well 
insulated against external disturbances. Subsequently, we use the ARDL approach 
to co-integration in order to isolate the effects of the capital controls on the pass-
through of external disturbances to domestic interest rates in those economies. 
We conclude that there is strong evidence that the capital controls allowed for 
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It is usually recognised by analysts that Chile and Colombia were 
spared from the financial turmoil originated in Mexico by the end of 1994; 
nevertheless, it is also evident that those two countries suffered 
difficulties following the Asian and Russian debacle at the end of that 
decade. In this paper, we will attempt to analyse whether the capital 
control measures
1 adopted by the two countries were successful in 
insulating those economies against external shocks. The obvious limitation 
of those polices lies in the fact that they cannot possibly tackle all the 
existing transmission channels of external disturbances, therefore they are 
bound to be ineffective against certain types of shocks, especially, strong 
ones that are transmitted in multiple ways.  
One issue that will inevitably hinder the task we proposed to 
accomplish is the difficulty in isolating the impact of the unremunerated 
reserve requirements (URR) from the effects of other policies, such as the 
exchange rate regime, for instance. Therefore, it will often be the case 
that our analysis will consider the whole external economic policy 
“package” and not merely the controls on inflows. Nevertheless, we will 
attempt to disentangle the specific role played by the capital controls in 
one the sections below.  
The ultimate aims of the URR were the reduction of the costs of 
sterilised intervention, the improvement of the term structure of external 
                                                 
1 Those countries adopted unremunerated reserve requirements on capital inflows 
throughout the 1990s. For a description of these policies see, for instance, David 
2005b.    3
debt and the mitigation of the appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
whilst giving room for manoeuvre for monetary policy. We believe that the 
study of its impact on the transmission of external shocks is an important 
issue that still needs to be addressed. Epstein, Grabel & Jomo (2003) for 
instance, state that “Chilean-style” controls are effective tools in reducing 
the impact of external shocks, but do not present systematic empirical 
evidence to that effect.  
This paper is divided into four sections. Firstly, we will review the 
channels through which the reserve requirements on capital inflows could 
possibly affect the transmission of international shocks to the domestic 
economy. Subsequently, we will present some preliminary evidence of the 
vulnerability of Chile and Colombia to external disturbances and of their 
response to some crisis episodes when compared to other Latin American 
countries. In the third section, we will present results from Vector 
Autoregressive models in order to assess the transmission of global 
financial shocks to the Chilean and Colombian economies. Finally, in 
section 4, we will use the ARDL approach to co-integration in order to 
attempt to isolate the effects of the capital controls on the pass-through of 
external disturbances to domestic interest rates. 
   4
1 The URR and International Shocks 
 
This section will sketch some of the channels through which controls 
on capital inflows, especially asymmetric
2 taxes, such as the 
unremunerated reserve requirements, could affect the transmission of 
international shocks to the domestic economy and, possibly, aid in the 
prevention of financial crises. Those issues have been thoroughly analysed 
elsewhere (see for instance David, 2005a and Dooley & Walsh, 2000). 
Arguably the most clear-cut case for the introduction of restrictions 
on capital inflows with the objective of averting financial crises relates to 
periods of excessive liquidity (euphoria), which are a characteristic of the 
upswing of financial cycles, as emphasised by Kindleberger (2000). 
Historically, according to this author, the origin of several financial market 
bubbles has been associated with some form of “good news” that would 
yield profitable opportunities to investors in certain assets. In response to 
these events arbitrageurs begin to bid-up the prices of these assets, 
trying to sustain the “euphoria” of noise traders. Eventually, when the 
bubble bursts, the collapse of asset prices entails a collapse in the value of 
collaterals and may lead to bankruptcies, inefficient liquidations and falls 
in investment.  
During the credit expansion phase, there is an increase in credit risk 
because the quality of financial intermediaries portfolio’s decreases, 
leading to an increase in non-performing loans. This is aggravated by the 
fact that financial market agents frequently have inappropriate responses 
to changes in risk over the economic cycle, such that risks are   5
underestimated during booms and overestimated during recessions. The 
so-called overborrowing syndrome (Mckinnon & Pill, 1999) sometimes 
linked to moral hazard due to government guarantees could be considered 
a special case of the previously outlined general “anatomy” of crises.  
In the presence of these dynamics, the adoption of restrictions on 
capital inflows in a countercyclical manner in other to mitigate the 
expansionary effects associated with surges in capital inflows seems to be 
an appropriate response by policy makers in capital importing countries 
with the objective of reducing economic volatility.  
The literature on currency crises highlights other circumstances 
during which controls on inflows might also be a useful device. The 
currency mismatch strand of the literature argues that if a substantial 
amount of debt is denominated in foreign currency due to “Original Sin”
3, 
a country could become financially fragile (vulnerable to self-fulfilling 
crises), as emphasised by Aghion et al. (2000). By taxing capital inflows it 
is possible to restrict the level of external indebtedness and limit the 
negative real effects of devaluations due to the exposure of domestic 
firm’s balance sheets. In fact, benefits arise because the decision by an 
individual firm to borrow in foreign currency imposes costs on the rest of 
the economy that are internalised by the tax on inflows.  
Furthermore, one of the stylised facts in the empirical literature on 
currency crises is that the maturity structure of external debt seems to 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Those taxes are asymmetric in the sense that they fall more heavily on short-
term capital inflows and did not apply to all capital flows (trade credits were 
usually exempt). 
3 Original Sin is a term coined by Eichengreen and Hausman (1999) that 
essentially refers to the inability of developing countries to issue debt abroad in 
their own currency (when they do, those are usually bonds indexed to the 
exchange rate, which stills fit in the Original Sin concept).   6
matter for the occurrence and severity of currency collapses (see Carlson 
and Hernandez, 2002). This fact has been addressed theoretically by the 
maturity mismatch literature (see especially Rodrik & Velasco, 1999). This 
type of model emphasises that in the presence of market failures, 
borrowers would not consider the effects of the stock of short-term debt 
on contractual interest rates
4 and would choose the privately less costly 
option of taking short-term rather than long-term debt.  Hence, reserve 
requirements on short-term capital inflows such as the deposit 
requirements adopted by Chile and Colombia could play a role in reducing 
the likelihood of liquidity problems by mitigating the externality associated 
with short-term debt, forcing borrowers to evaluate the social costs of 
external borrowing translated into financial crises. In fact, an explicit or 
implicit tax on short-term debt would reduce the difference between the 
relative costs of short-term and long-term debt, thus reducing the 
incentives for potentially dangerous excessive short-term capital inflows.  
Another important channel through which the URR might be able to 
reduce the vulnerability of a country to external shocks relates to the 
prevention of real exchange rate overvaluation. Dornbusch, Goldfajn and 
Valdes (1995) demonstrate empirically that an overvalued real exchange 
rate is a fairly good predictor of future currency crises; therefore the 
impact of the reserve requirements on the real exchange rate seems to be 
of considerable importance.  
There is a vast literature that focuses on specific transmission 
channels of financial crises from one country/region to another and 
                                                 
4 In the Rodrik & Velasco model the interest rates paid depend on the level of 
short-term debt, since it affects the likelihood of long-term debt contracts to be 
honoured.   7
emphasises mostly trade and financial links as the main carriers of spill-
over effects associated with financial stress (see Dungey et al., 2003 for a 
survey). The spread of crises through trade links can take place via 
competitive devaluations or simply by the reduction in demand for exports 
due to a weaker economic situation in the “ground zero” and other 
affected countries.  
The role of financial links is slightly more complex.  Whilst some 
authors concentrate on common lender effects  (a lender is affected by 
crisis in one country, faces liquidity problems such as margin calls and has 
to liquidate its assets elsewhere); others focus on “rebalancing effects” in 
the context of standard portfolio models, where investors pull away from 
risky assets (emerging markets) when faced with a large negative shock, 
i.e. an increase in volatility (Schinasi and Smith, 1999). The latter effect is 
akin to a simple increase in risk aversion by international players. Calvo 
and Mendoza (2000) emphasise the importance of information 
asymmetries and costs in acquiring information about specific markets, 
which encourage herd behaviour by international investors as a major 
source of “contagion”. We could also consider a more general story, where 
in the presence of multiple equilibria, a crisis in one country can act as a 
sunspot and coordinate investor’s expectations. In this case, the 
transmission of crises occurs purely because of changes in investor’s 
beliefs.   
What role could the URR play in addressing those transmission 
channels of crises? This type of controls on capital inflows is capable of 
mitigating problems related to liquidity risk by increasing the maturity 
structure of external debt, hence it may reduce the exposure to sudden   8
capital outflows associated with the “common lender”, “risk aversion”, 
“Calvo and Mendoza-style herd behaviour” and other multiple equilibria 
stories. Nonetheless, the reserve requirements cannot affect trade links in 
a direct clear-cut way and therefore cannot prevent distress when trade is 
a major transmission channel of shocks. 
We should conclude this section by noting that one cannot expect 
controls on capital inflows to insulate an economy against all sources of 
difficulties in its external sector. These polices may be ineffective against 
runs (i.e. massive capital outflows) by domestic residents, which were 
particularly important in the Mexican and Brazilian crisis episodes see 
Frenkel & Schmukler (1996) and Goldfajn (2000)
5. 
 
2 Preliminary Evidence 
 
We will start this section by analysing selected indicators of external 
vulnerability for Chile and Colombia presented in Tables 1 and 2. One 
should note the gradual build-up of vulnerability during the second-half of 
the 1990s, evidenced, among other factors, by persistent current account 
deficits and real exchange rate appreciation in both economies, despite a 
visible amelioration in the maturity structure of external debt. In fact, this 
deterioration of the vulnerability position of the two countries may be 
confirmed when we consider other solvency and liquidity indicators.  
In the Chilean case, it is apparent that during the 1990s, indicators 
such as the ratio of M2 to reserves, the ratio of debt service to exports   9
and the ratio of reserves to total debt remained stable (despite decreases 
in the latter since 1995). Nevertheless, the ratio of total foreign debt to 
exports presented large increases in the second half of the decade (see 
Table 1). One should note that this variable is particularly important for 
currency mismatch stories of financial fragility and currency crises. Models 
in the vein of Krugman (1999) place the ratio of debt denominated in 
foreign currency to exports as one of the main determinants of financial 
vulnerability in developing countries. 
As far as Colombia is concerned, the ratio of reserves to total 
external debt decreased significantly since 1996, the ratio of external debt 
to exports also deteriorated since 1995 and the ratio of M2 over reserves 
also increased, reaching a level of 2.7 in 1999. These figures indicate that 
the solvency and liquidity positions of the country were worse by that 
period (see Table 2).  On the other hand the ratio of debt service to 
exports remained fairly stable in the second half of the decade.  
Hence, despite what could be seen as an overall relatively secure 
financial position over the decade, which might explain the resilience of 
those economies against certain shocks, by 1998 the presence of 
significant disequilibria in what concerns the current account, the real 
exchange rate and several vulnerability indicators has to be 
acknowledged. 
In the Chilean case, authors such as Ffrench-Davis & Tapia (2001) 
hold the complacency in capital account management polices verified after 
1996 directly responsible for the inability of this country to limit its 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Nevertheless, one has to note that by changing the maturity structure of 
external debt, the controls make runs more expensive and hence could play an 
indirect role in preventing them.   10
increasing external vulnerability. They argue that the authorities did not 
respond to the increasingly alarming signs of fragility, such as the large 
successive current account deficits, and that the URR should have been 
increased to face the surge in capital inflows verified after 1996.  
This lack of action could be explained by an excessive optimism by 
Chilean authorities regarding the sustainability of the macroeconomic 
disequilibria that were arising. Nevertheless, it is also important to note 
that, during that period, multilateral institutions were strongly 
encouraging developing countries to adopt full capital account 
convertibility, i.e. eliminate all forms of capital controls, including the 
URR. In addition, especially after 1997, it became clear that the central 
bank gave priority to its inflation stabilisation goal over other objectives, 
such as maintaining a stable and competitive real exchange rate.  
The extensive liberalisation of capital outflows is another factor that 
might have contributed to the difficulties faced by Chile in its external 
sector following the Asian and Russian crises. For instance, the percentage 
of foreign investment by Chilean pension funds permitted by law was 
raised from 6% of their portfolio in 1995 to 12% in April 1997.  
Chile also had strong trade links with the East Asian countries, 
according to data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, 37.5% of 
Chilean exports were directed to Emerging Asia, China, Hong-Kong, Japan 
and Singapore in 1997. Albeit this may suggest a trade component in the 
transmission of that crisis, we have to bear in mind that the strongest 
external shock affecting the Chilean economy was actually related to the 
Russian default of August 1998. Indeed, by mid-1998 Chile faced large 
reversals in capital inflows.    11
Thus, it seems that a number of important transmission channels of 
external disturbances to Chile are precisely the ones that the 
unremunerated reserve requirements were not designed to affect, i.e. 
trade related channels. In addition, it seems that the capital control 
policies might have been effective in tackling increased vulnerabilities 
associated with large imbalances, had they been used more actively in the 
second half of the 1990s.  
The deterioration of the external position of Colombia during the 
1990s was caused by the unsustainable increase in government 
expenditures (see Table 2) and the boom-bust financial cycle verified from 
1991 to 1998 following the external financial liberalisation process. The 
credit boom period of the early 90s was accompanied by a large increase 
in private indebtedness, which was financed, in part, by large capital 
inflows. The expansionary pressure fuelled a bubble in asset prices and a 
deterioration of the quality of loans. A pro-cyclical fiscal policy increased 
aggregate demand even further in the second half of the decade.  
In addition, competition by foreign banks that entered the country 
following the financial liberalisation process may also have contributed to 
the reduction in the quality of the loan portfolio of domestic banks. In fact, 
this deterioration in the quality of loans is evidenced by the increase in 
non-performing loans from around 2% in 1995 to 6% at the end of 1997, 
10% in 1999 and 13% in 2000 according to Central Bank figures. 
Evidently, at least a certain part of this increase in non-performing loans 
is endogenous to the financial distress verified in 1998/1999.  
Later in the decade the public sector resorted to large external 
borrowings to finance its deficit (Uribe and Vargas, 2002), as we can see   12
from Table 2, the government budget deficit amounted to 3.1% of GDP in 
1997, 3.4% in 1998 and 5.1% in 1999. In this context, a succession of 
large current account deficits took place, rendering the country vulnerable 
to reversals in capital flows and negative shocks in its terms of trade, both 
of which occurred in the 1998-1999 period, culminating in the currency 
crisis of September 1999
6.  
Contrary to Chile, Colombia did not have extensive trade links with 
East Asian countries (in fact, merely 3.6% of Colombian exports were 
directed to Emerging Asia, China, Hong-Kong, Japan and Singapore in 
1997). The bulk of Colombia’s trade was concentrated in Latin America 
and the United States (66.6% of Colombian exports in 1997, once again 
according to the IMF’s direction of trade statistics). 
How serious was the 1998/1999 banking and currency crisis in 
Colombia when compared to the experience of other developing countries 
around that period? This is an extremely difficult question to answer. The 
loss in terms of output growth seems to have been significant. As shown 
in Table 2, output grew by only 0.5% in 1998 and fell by 4.1% in 1999, 
just to mention the immediate aftermath of the financial difficulties. In 
addition, according to Herrera and Perry (2003), the rescue costs of 
distressed financial institutions might have amounted to 8% of GDP.  
With the objective of obtaining a first assessment of the response of 
the economies that adopted controls on inflows to external disturbances, 
we will examine the behaviour of domestic interest rates during periods of 
major international financial disturbances. Figure 1 presents weekly data 
                                                 
6 Note that the devaluation by itself does not mean that controls were ineffective, 
but simply that they were not sufficient to prevent the bust in the financial cycle.    13
for 90-day deposit interest rates for Chile and Argentina (a country that 
did not adopt capital controls) from March 1994 to March 2000.  
We can clearly see that Argentina responded more to the Mexican 
currency crisis of December 1994 than Chile has
7. Nevertheless, Chilean 
rates increased significantly more than Argentinean ones following the 
development of financial difficulties in East Asia and especially after the 
Russian default in August 1998 despite the presence of capital controls 
from June 1991 until September 1998. In fact, Chile had a very strong 
reaction to this episode. Ffrench-Davis and Tapia (2001) argue that the 
authorities overreacted in order the preserve the credibility of the inflation 
stabilisation achieved during the decade. As we mentioned before, one 
should remember that Chile had strong trade links with East Asia and also 
suffered a severe terms of trade shock at that time. Evidently, the 
comparison between the reactions of the two countries is only indicative 
as the policy regimes, inflation rates and the economies themselves are 
very distinct, i.e. Argentina could hardly be regarded as a rigorous 
“control group”, since the adoption or not of reserve requirements is 
certainly not the only factor that differentiates the two economies.  
Similar conclusions arise when we compare the movements in 
Colombian and Argentinean deposit rates for the same period as 
illustrated in Figure 2 (note that Argentinean rates are presented on the 
left-hand-side axis and Colombian rates on the right-hand-side axis). 
Colombian deposit rates did not react as much as the Argentinean ones to 
the Mexican currency collapse, i.e. there was no sudden increase in 
                                                 
7 One has to bear in mind, since we are using nominal interest rates, the 
differentials in inflation. In any case, our focus in these figures is the volatility of 
the series not their level.    14
Colombian rates as in the Argentinean case following the Peso 
devaluation. Nevertheless, Colombian rates reacted substantially in the 
period of “contagion” from East Asia and Russia, although this could also 
be linked to internal problems, as we emphasised previously.  
Figures 3 and 4 present weekly data from June 1997 to June 2002 
for deposit rates in Chile, Colombia and Mexico (In Figure 4 Mexican rates 
are represented on the left hand side axis and Chilean rates on the right 
hand side axis). It is clear that sharp increases in domestic rates were 
verified in the three countries following the August 1998 financial crisis in 
Russia, which indicates that those economies were affected by spill-overs 
from that period of stress in international financial markets.  
This initial cursory look at the movements in interest rates for these 
countries in periods of high volatility does not allow us to distinguish 
whether countries that adopted controls on capital flows were 
systematically affected by external disturbances in a different manner 
than countries that did not resort to those policies. We will attempt to 
address this issue in Section 3 below, using VAR models.  
Overall, we may conclude that when we simply consider the 
descriptive evidence to compare the reactions of different countries to 
crisis episodes, it seems that that Chile and Colombia, two countries that 
adopted policies to manage actively their capital accounts, have been 
relatively well insulated against external disturbances, at least until the 
mid-1990s. Those countries were also relatively successful in keeping 
macroeconomic imbalances in check during that early period. In the next 
section, we will attempt to produce more systematic evidence on the   15
transmission of international shocks to Latin American economies using 
Vector Autoregressive models. 
 
3 Evidence from Vector Autoregressive Models 
 
Our objective in this section is to obtain some stylised facts about 
the response of domestic macroeconomic variables to external shocks, 
measured by the spread paid by emerging markets over U.S. instruments 
of the same maturity. For this purpose, we will use the global Emerging 
Markets Bond Index (EMBI) spreads constructed by the American 
investment bank J.P. Morgan. This index tracks the traded market for U.S. 
Dollar denominated Brady and other similar bonds and is widely regarded 
as an appropriate measure of foreign investor’s risk perceptions regarding 
emerging markets. We chose to use the EMBI rather than the commonly 
used EMBI+ spreads (which is a less restrictive index, including Eurobonds 
and other sovereign debt instruments), because of data availability as the 
latter series only starts in 1998
8.  
We will implement reduced form models of the transmission of 
international shocks to macroeconomic variables in some Latin American 
countries using the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) methodology. Other 
authors such as Edwards (2000) and Edison and Reinhart (2001) have 
previously used this framework for similar purposes. Applications of VAR 
models generally consist of estimating an appropriate statistical model of 
the data and computing impulse response functions and variance 
                                                 
8 Chilean securities are not included in the EMBI index and Colombian ones were 
only included after 1998. In any case, the VAR methodology would be able to 
tackle the possible endogeneity problems that might arise.   16
decompositions to analyse the dynamic effect of a standard shock in one 
variable on the rest of the system.  
When specifying a reduced-form VAR model it is crucial to assess 
whether the variables included in the system are stationary or not for 
inference to be valid, since it is well known that testing hypothesis on 
coefficients of integrated variables requires non-standard asymptotic 
theory
9 (Canova, 1995). Harris and Sollis (2003) emphasise that standard 
univariate Unit Root testing procedures such as the Dickey-Fuller, 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests suffer from a lack of 
power, i.e. in finite samples they tend not to reject the null hypothesis of 
non-stationarity, when it should be rejected.  
When performing the Unit root tests for the variables included in 
our models we chose to implement tests using the GLS de-trending 
procedure proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996), which 
optimises the power of the test. We report results obtained for the ADF 
test with GLS de-trending and also for the Ng-Perron (2001) testing 
procedure that incorporates both GLS de-trending and a new information 
criterion for selecting the lag length of the model
10. 
In our first model, we will use a foreign exchange market pressure 
index for Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico as endogenous variables 
in the system. We construct the pressure index following the empirical 
literature on currency crises in order to account for the fact that in periods 
of stress due to external shocks the burden of adjustment does not fall 
exclusively on interest rates, but it is also reflected in changes in 
                                                 
9 Although Sims, Stock & Watson (1990) prove that coefficients are consistently 
estimated independently of the order of integration. 
10 See once again Harris and Sollis (2003) for details.   17
international reserves and changes in the nominal exchange rate.  Our 
index is a weighted average of changes in domestic interest rates, 
nominal exchange rates and the log of foreign reserves, where the 
weights are given by the inverse of the standard deviation of each series 
such that none of the individual components would dominate the index 
(see Eichengreen, Rose and Wyploz, 1996 for a similar index). Hence, the 






























We estimated the model from May 1991 to June 2001 and included 
the global EMBI spread and the pressure indexes, as constructed above 
for the different countries, as endogenous variables in our system. The 
data on reserves and nominal exchange rates used to build the pressure 
indexes comes from the IMF’s IFS database. In addition, the Junk bond 
spread and the log of world oil price index (included to capture real shocks 
and obtained from the IMF’s IFS database) were used as exogenous 
variables in the system. The series on the risk premium over U.S. 
government securities paid by American non-investment grade (“Junk”) 
bonds was obtained from the Bloomberg database. This variable has been 
used in the literature as a measure of international investor’s risk appetite 
(see Mody & Taylor, 2002). 
We chose a lag structure of 4 for this model, as there was a conflict 
between  the different information criteria, the LM test does not detect 
serial correlation of the residuals for this specification. The Unit Root tests 
performed and reported in Table 3 showed that all the pressure indexes   18
are stationary. Note also that both tests reject the null of a Unit Root for 
the EMBI spread, the Junk bond spread and the world oil price series at 
the 5% level.  
It is important to note that we decided not to include Brazil in our 
models due to the fact that the 1994 Real stabilisation plan represents a 
significant structural break that would have reduced the sample size of the 
specifications (prior to 1994 this country was experiencing a turbulent 
period of high inflation). In addition, Brazil adopted controls on inflows of 
a quite different form (see David, 2005b) and, therefore, neither 
constitutes an adequate “observation” of a country that imposed reserve 
requirements nor an appropriate “counterfactual” for our analysis. 
One should also bear in mind that we have included in our sample a 
number of years during which the controls on capital inflows were not in 
place as well. Nevertheless, we believe that this does not pose a problem 
as far as the interpretation of the results is concerned, as the controls 
were designed to deal with surges in capital inflows lasting several 
months, which were not verified in the post 1998 period. Hence, tax-
equivalent rates would probably have been small (non-binding) if the 
controls were in place. On the other hand, considering a larger sample 
may allow us improve the reliability of the estimation and infer the lasting 
effects (in the medium term) of those polices in terms of a reduction of 
financial fragility.  
The generalised impulse responses presented in Figure 5 
demonstrate that  the pressure indexes for Chile and Colombia do not   19
respond significantly
11 to shocks to the EMBI spread nor do they respond 
significantly to shocks to the other countries’ (Argentina and Mexico) 
pressure indexes. Nevertheless, the Argentinean and Mexican indexes do 
respond to EMBI shocks and Mexico is the country that presents the 
strongest response. It is also of interest to note that the Argentinean 
pressure index presents a statistically significant response to shocks in the 
Mexican pressure index indicating that financial “contagion” occurred 
between these two countries.  
The advantage of using generalised impulse responses when 
compared to standard Cholesky ones is that they do not depend on the 
ordering of the variables in the system. Generalised impulse responses 
compare the conditional expectation of a variable in the model, given a 
shock and the history of the model, to the conditional expectation of that 
variable given the historically observed information of the model (see 
Koop, Pesaran & Potter, 1996 for details). The results obtained from the 
impulse response functions are robust to the impulse definition, for 
instance when a Cholesky decomposition was used we got qualitatively 
similar responses. 
Table 4  shows the variance decomposition for the VAR model 
estimated above. One should note that only a small percentage of the 
forecast errors in the Chilean and Colombian pressure indexes can be 
attributed to EMBI shocks. In fact, the figures are 0.07% and 1.17% for 
the first month for each country respectively. Nevertheless, when we look 
                                                 
11 Throughout this paper a “significant” impulse response for each month 
following a shock means that the interval defined by the error bands does not 
contain the value zero. Note that error bands were calculated using Monte Carlo 
simulations (1000 repetitions).   20
at the Argentinean and Mexican indexes for the same horizon, those 
figures become much larger (15.69% and 40.26% respectively).  
These results indicate that the unremunerated reserve 
requirements (combined with other capital account polices) might have 
helped to insulate the Chilean and Colombian economies from certain 
types of global external financial shocks, namely the ones captured by the 
EMBI spread. Evidently, at this stage, we cannot distinguish whether this 
difference is due to capital account policies, other macroeconomic policies, 
or simply the type of exchange rate regime adopted by the different 
countries. One also has to note that the precise role played by the capital 
controls in insulating those economies was not clarified in our empirical 
analysis so far.  
In order to confirm the validity of our results we decided to 
estimate models for Chile and Colombia individually, including a wider 
selection of macroeconomic variables. Firstly, we estimated a model of the 
Chilean economy using monthly data from January 1991 to December 
2000
12, including as endogenous variables the EMBI spread, the output 
gap, the difference between inflation in the past 12 months (change in the 
consumer price index) and the inflation target, the exchange rate indexed 
deposit rate, the Chilean sovereign risk premium and the cyclical 
component of the real exchange rate. We also included as exogenous 
variables the logarithm of the Chilean terms of trade and the Junk bond 
spread. The Akaike, Schwartz and H-Q information criteria suggested a 
model with two lags and there is no evidence of serial correlation for this 
specification according to the LM test.    21
The construction of the Chilean (and Colombian) country risk series 
is described in David, 2005b. The output gap variable used for Chile was 
defined as the difference between the log of the economic activity index 
(IMACEC) and its trend and irregular components obtained using a 
structural time series model (estimated by Kalman filtering techniques). 
The monthly inflation target series was kindly provided by Gallego at al. 
(2002) and the cyclical component of the real exchange rate was obtained 
by fitting a structural time series model to the series and removing the 
trend and irregular components. The source for all the variables included 
is the Central Bank of Chile, except for the terms of trade series that was 
constructed by Benett and Valdes (2001). The Unit Root tests performed 
(see table 5) show that the null of non-stationarity is rejected at the 5% 
level for the inflation, interest rate and country risk series. Non-
stationarity is also rejected for the terms of trade series at the 10% level 
and for the output gap and real exchange rate series at the 1% level.  
The generalised impulse responses are presented in Figure 6. One 
should note that the domestic exchange-rate-indexed deposit rate does 
not present a statistically significant response to shocks to the EMBI 
spread, whereas the real exchange only presents a marginally significant 
response between the second and fourth months. Therefore, the impact of 
EMBI shocks on the real exchange rate seems to be relatively short-lived 
and small. In addition, the domestic deposit rate also seems to be resilient 
to shocks to the Chilean sovereign risk premium and so does the real 
exchange rate.  
                                                                                                                                            
12 We chose this period because of data availability issues and to ensure that a 
single policy regime is considered.   22
These conclusions are confirmed by the variance decomposition 
analysis (see Table 6). Shocks to the EMBI spread are only responsible for 
a small part of the forecast errors in the real exchange rate and the 
domestic deposit rate. In the first period, the EMBI accounts for 1.13% of 
forecast errors in the interest rate and 1.17% in the real exchange rate, 
whereas in period 10 the figures are 4.79% and 10.43%  respectively. 
Hence, it seems that interest rates were insulated against external shocks 
in Chile, whereas the real exchange rate is slightly more vulnerable.  
To sum up, the URR and other capital account policies seem to have 
been capable of reducing the pass-through of external shocks to the 
Chilean economy, especially as far as deposit interest rates are concerned. 
Nonetheless, the capital account policies did not completely insulate Chile, 
as the real exchange rate was more vulnerable to shocks.  
In addition, we estimated a similar model for the Colombian 
economy for the period from January 1993 to June 2002
13. We included as 
endogenous variables the EMBI spread, the output gap, the difference 
between the inflation rate and the annual inflation target set by the 
Central Bank, the 90-day real deposit rate
14, the Colombian sovereign risk 
premium and the cyclical component of real exchange rate. We also 
included as exogenous variables the log of the world oil price index, the 
Junk Bond spread and a dummy variable that takes the value of zero 
before September 1999 and one thereafter to account for the change in 
the exchange rate band.  
The output gap variable was constructed as the difference between 
the log of the industrial production index and its trend, seasonal and 
                                                 
13 The period was chosen because of data availability.    23
irregular components using a structural time series model.  The cyclical 
component of the real exchange rate was also obtained by de-trending the 
series using a structural time series model.  The primary source for all 
these variables is the Central Bank of Colombia.  
The Akaike information criterion suggests a model with two lags 
and the LM test does not detect serial correlation for that specification. 
Unit Root tests reported in table 7 show that all the variables included are 
stationary, except for the country risk premium. We decided to estimate a 
model including this variable in levels to make the interpretation of the 
results more clear. McCallum (1993) argues that if the residuals of each 
equation in the system are stationary and there is no evidence of serial 
correlation, the model in levels can be correctly estimated. The Unit Root 
tests presented in the appendix indeed show that the residuals of each 
equation in the system are stationary.  
The generalised impulse response functions obtained are reported 
in Figure 7. One can observe that the domestic interest rate presents a 
marginally significant response to EMBI shocks between periods 2 and 5. 
The real exchange rate also presents a marginally significant response to 
EMBI shocks from period two to four. Hence, it seems that both domestic 
interest rates and the real exchange rate were relatively insulated against 
external financial disturbances, as the effects of EMBI shocks were small 
(barely different from zero) and short-lived.  
When shocks to the country risk premium are considered, it is 
possible to observe that according to this model, the domestic deposit rate 
only presented a marginally significant response to country risk shocks. 
                                                                                                                                            
14 The nominal interest rate minus inflation in the past 12 months.    24
Nonetheless, the country risk variable seems to have larger effects on the 
real exchange rate (the response of the real exchange rate to country risk 
shocks is significant until the forth month and the shock dies out after 6 
months).  
The variance decomposition analysis (see Table 8) shows that 
shocks to the EMBI spread explain 23.24% of the forecast errors in the 
Colombian sovereign risk after 2 months, but only 3.32% of errors in 
interest rates and 2.66% of errors in the real exchange rate. These results 
clarify the conclusions obtained from the impulse response functions. The 
Colombian country risk seems to co-move with global risk premia, 
whereas domestic interest rates and the real exchange rate are relatively 
insulated from those shocks. We may conclude that the capital account 
management policies were relatively successful in insulating the 
Colombian economy against global shocks (as measured by the EMBI 
spreads).  
    
4 Disentangling the Effects of the URR  
 
In this section, we will attempt to isolate the possible role of the 
reserve requirements on capital inflows as far as the pass-through of 
external shocks to domestic interest rates is concerned and confirm 
whether those capital account restrictions contributed towards a greater 
autonomy for domestic monetary policy. Indeed, following the results 
from previous sections, our main conjecture is that the URR did reduce 
the effect of foreign shocks on domestic rates even in the context of a 
crawling band exchange rate regime.    25
It is well known in the econometrics literature that interest rates 
frequently behave in ways close to Unit Roots in finite samples. 
Nonetheless, it seems counterintuitive that they would present Unit Roots 
as this would mean that some series could go to infinity and others reach 
negative values. Series that are quite persistent in this way can present 
the same estimation problems in standard models as regressions involving 
non-stationary variables. In addition, the application of standard co-
integration analysis tools such as the Johansen procedure requires the 
classification of the variables included in the model into I(1) or I(0), which 
is difficult in this case.  
We will estimate error correction models that circumvent that issue 
for the Chilean indexed policy interest rate and include the 90-day Libor 
interest rate (in real terms) and the tax equivalent of the reserve 
requirement as explanatory variables. Hence, we implemented a model 
describing the dynamics of the Chilean interest rate, which is given by: 
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This expression determines the first differences in the domestic 
interest rate as a function of past changes of the rate itself, past changes 
in the LIBOR rate (
* i ), changes in the URR and an error-correction term. 
As mentioned before, it is not possible to determine unambiguously 
whether the variables that would form the long run relationship are 
stationary or not. Therefore, we decided to adopt the Autoregressive-
Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to Co-integration proposed by Pesaran et 
al. (2001) that does not require the classification of variables into 
stationary and non-stationary. This approach consists of two stages.    26
Firstly, a test for the existence of a long-run relation between the 
variables is implemented. It amounts to a simple F-test for the joint 
significance of the lagged levels of the variables in the error-correction 
model outlined above. This F-statistic has a non-standard distribution 
irrespective of whether the variables are I(0) or I(1) and the appropriate 
critical value bounds have been tabulated by Pesaran et al. in order to test 
for the null of no co-integration (i.e. coefficients are not significantly 
different for zero).  
In fact, there are two sets of critical values: one assuming that all 
the variables in the model are I(0) and the other assuming that all the 
variables are I(1). This provides a band covering all possible classification 
of variables. If the computed F-statistic falls outside the band, it is 
possible to reach a conclusion regarding the existence of a co-integration 
relationship. On the other hand, if the statistic falls inside the band the 
result of the inference is inconclusive and depends whether the variables 
are I(1) or I(0). The second stage of the analysis refers to estimating the 
coefficients for the long-run relationships and making inferences about 
their values. 
We estimated models for the Chilean rate on lagged values of itself, 
lagged values of the LIBOR interest rate (obtained from the IMF’s IFS 
database) and lagged values of the tax equivalent of the reserve 
requirements
15 for the period from January 1991 to December 2000 (six 
lags were used in all specifications)
16. We experimented two basic 
                                                 
15Details of the calculation of the tax-equivalent of the URR were given in David, 
2005b. In our specifications, we used an average of the tax equivalent for 
different maturities of capital inflows.  
16 One of the reasons why we did not extend our sample beyond December 2000 
is that the inclusion of the 1999 dummy variable would change the asymptotic   27
different models: one with a dummy for the turbulent period following the 
Russian default in 1998, which represents a transition away from the use 
of controls on inflows and another model including a dummy for the 
change in the exchange rate regime in September 1999. 
As argued by Pesaran et al. (2001), ARDL estimation is applicable 
even when the explanatory variables are endogenous, provided that the 
order of the model is large enough to account for contemporaneous 
correlations between errors in the data generating process. In our case, 
the foreign interest is evidently long-run forcing and our tests for a model 
including the URR as the endogenous variable fail to reject the null that 
the level variables do not enter significantly in the equation, which 
indicates that the URR can be treated as an exogenous variable
17. 
The F-statistic for those models of Chilean interest rates are 11.834 
and 4.947 respectively, whereas the critical bounds at the 5% level, 
calculated by Pesaran et al. are 3.10 and 3.87 (the critical bounds at the 
1% level are 4.13 and 5.00). Hence, we can conclude that there exists a 
long run relationship between those variables for the period analysed, 
irrespectively of their order of integration, as the test statistic exceeds the 
critical bounds.  
We now proceed to the estimation of the ARDL model. The Akaike 
information criterion suggests a ARDL(2,0,4) model for the specification 
including the 1998 dummy. If we consider the long-run relationship 
                                                                                                                                            
results of the tests, if the fraction of the sample during which the dummy is 
different from zero does not go to zero as the sample size increases (see Pesaran 
et al, 2001, p.307). 
17 The test statistic is 1.83, which is below the critical bounds both at the 5% 
level and at the 10% level.    28
between the variables, the estimated coefficients are (with p-values in 
brackets):  
1998 96 . 2 20 . 0 27 . 0 51 . 4
] 00 . 0 [ ] 00 . 0 [
*
] 00 . 0 [ ] 00 . 0 [ Dummy URR i i t t t + + + =  
 
One should note that all the coefficients are highly significant (even 
at the 1% level). The coefficient of the URR is positive indicating that the 
URR allowed for higher interest rates in the long-run than would have 
been the case in the absence of capital controls. An increase in the URR 
by one standard deviation would lead to an increase in the interest rate of 
0.2 percentage points.  
Hence, the adoption of the URR mitigated part of the expansionary 
pressures due to high capital inflows and allowed for greater monetary 
policy autonomy. One also has to note that the coefficient for the foreign 
interest rate is only 0.27, therefore indicating that the adjustment of local 
rates to changes in foreign rates is less than proportional, thus confirming 
the evidence of relative monetary independence.  
The estimation results for the error-correction model outlined above 
are presented in Table 9. All regressors are statistically significant and the 
diagnostic statistics do not show any evidence of serial correlation of the 
residuals and the high R-squared (0.56) indicates a good fit. 
One interesting feature of the results presented above concerns the 
coefficient for the error correction term, which is relatively small (-0.306). 
This implies that the half-life, calculated as ln(0.5)/ln(1+error-correction 
coefficient) is of approximately 2 months. This suggests that the speed of 
adjustment of domestic interest rates to foreign ones is only moderate, 
hence indicating greater monetary policy independence in the Chilean   29
case. Therefore, we can conclude that the evidence so far corroborates 
our previous inferences concerning the insulating properties of controls on 
capital inflows.  
Subsequently, we also applied the ARDL approach to analyse the 
effects of the reserve requirements on Colombian 90-day deposit interest 
rates
18. We estimated a very similar model to the one outlined for Chile. 
The sample period goes from January 1991 to December 2000 and a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 after September 1999, when the 
exchange rate band was abandoned was included in the regressions
19. The 
F-statistic for this model is 4.242, which lies outside the bounds at the 5% 
level, but lies inside the bounds at the 1% level, therefore yielding 
inconclusive results. Nonetheless, given the small sample size, significance 
at the 5% level is more than adequate.  
Hence, we can be reasonably confident that a long run relationship 
between those variables exists, irrespective of the order of integration of 
the variables. In addition, the tests indicate that the URR can be treated, 
once again, as a long run forcing variable (the F-statistic for the model 
with the URR as the dependent variable is 1.84, which is below the bounds 
at the 5% level).  
The Akaike information criterion suggests a ARDL(4,1,6) model. The 
estimated coefficients for the long run relationship are (with p-values in 
brackets):  
1999 08 . 5 11 . 0 74 . 1 96 . 3
] 06 . 0 [ ] 08 . 0 [
*
] 02 . 0 [ ] 07 . 0 [ Dummy URR i i t t t − + + =  
                                                 
18 We used real (ex post) interest rates in this case to facilitate the comparison 
with the Chilean experience and eliminate the noise created by volatile inflation.   
19 As in the previous case, the measure of the tax equivalent used is an average 
for capital inflows of different maturities.    30
One should note that all the coefficients are significant at the 10% 
level and have the expected signs. The coefficient of the URR is positive 
permitting us to infer that the URR allowed for higher interest rates in the 
long-run. Nonetheless, the coefficient is smaller than in the Chilean case. 
An increase in the URR by one standard deviation would lead to an 
increase in the domestic interest rate of 0.11 percentage points. 
The coefficient for the foreign interest rate exceeds 1, implying 
more than proportionate changes in domestic rate when the foreign rate 
changes. This is not very surprising for an emerging market and it’s in line 
with the evidence towards over-adjustment of interest rates in developing 
countries to shocks in foreign interest rates provided by Frankel et al. 
(2004).  
The estimation results for the error-correction model are presented 
in Table 10. Most regressors are statistically significant at conventional 
levels and the diagnostic statistics do not show any evidence of serial 
correlation of the residuals. Once again, the relatively high R-squared 
indicates a good fit of the model (although the normality of the residuals 
is rejected at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level).  
The coefficient for the error correction term is small (-0.145), which 
indicates that adjustment towards equilibrium occurs slowly. In fact the 
half-life for Colombian rates is approximately 4 months (twice the one of 
Chile). This suggests, once again, a degree of monetary autonomy. 
Therefore, the evidence seems to indicate that the controls on capital 
inflows adopted were capable of mitigating the impact of external shocks 
on the domestic economy for both the Chilean and Colombian cases.   
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Conclusion 
 
As emphasised by Ocampo & Palma (2005), unremunerated reserve 
requirements can be an effective flexible instrument to balance 
macroeconomic disequilibria arising from surges in capital inflows, such as 
large current account deficits linked to an excessive real exchange rate 
appreciation. Furthermore, this type of capital controls is instrumental for 
the application of countercyclical macroeconomic policies; since they allow 
for greater policy autonomy in the face of pro-cyclical capital flows, as 
confirmed by the evidence presented in this paper.  
It is clear that Chile and Colombia were affected by spill-overs from 
financial stress related to the East Asian and Russian crises. Nonetheless, 
what was of direct interest in our analysis was how much these economies 
have been affected when compared to other countries. We concluded that, 
when a very specific type of financial shock is considered, namely shocks 
to the EMBI index, the Chilean and Colombian economies seem to have 
been relatively well insulated against external disturbances, when 
compared to other large Latin American countries.  
In addition, when we look at the two countries individually, we 
found that, in the case of Chile, global financial shocks as measured by 
the EMBI index; did not affect domestic interest rates and only marginally 
affected the real exchange rate. The Colombian economy also seems to 
have been relatively well insulated against external disturbances, as EMBI 
shocks only marginally affected both interest rates and the real exchange 
rate. One has to bear in mind that the reserve requirements are not the   32
only policy measures that could possibly have reduced the external 
vulnerability in those countries. 
Furthermore, by disentangling the specific effects of the capital 
controls on domestic interest rates, using the ARDL approach to Co-
integration, we were able to demonstrate that there is strong evidence 
that the reserve requirements allowed for greater policy autonomy and did 
reduce the pass-through of external disturbances to the economies 
considered. In fact, the effects of foreign interest rate shocks on domestic 
rates were reduced even in the context of a crawling band exchange rate 
regime.  
One has to acknowledge that the insulating properties of the 
controls are not complete, in the sense that they are only capable of 
reducing the pass-through of external shocks, not eliminate it. Despite the 
fact that controls on capital inflows have the potential to be beneficial in 
terms of reducing financial vulnerability, this does not mean that these 
policies were applied “optimally” by the two countries at all moments in 
time.  
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Figure 3 
Mexican and Chilean Deposit Rates (1997-2002) 
  Source: Datastream 
 
Figure 4 
Mexican and Colombian Deposit Rates 1997-2002 
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Table 1 




  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Short-term Debt/ 
External Debt (c) 
17.6 12.3 16.9 20.0 17.4 15.6  11.4  5.6 5.3 3.4 
Reserves/Total Debt (a)  35.3 42.9 51.2 50.2 55.8 58.1 56.6 56.7 44.1 38.2 
External Debt/Exports 
(a) 
179.6 154.1 148.0 168.9 164.8 126.3 137.9 143.8 180.8 184.2 
Debt Service/Exports (a)  25.8 23.2 20.8 23.2 19.7 25.3 30.9 20.2 22.3 25.4 
M2/Reserves Ratio (a) 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.3 
Current Account/GDP 
(b) 
-1.6 -0.3 -2.3 -5.7 -3.1 -2.1 -5.1 -5.0 -5.7 -0.1 
Trade Balance
I (b)  1080.3 1659.0 1206.7  125.1  321.5 -1501.6  -1686.6  -2486.9  -2522.8  1968.6 
GDP Growth (%) (d)  3.7 7.9  12.2  6.9 5.7  10.6  7.2 7.5 3.9  -1.1 
Government Budget 
Surplus (% of GDP) (c) 
0.8 1.5 2.3 2.0 1.7 2.6 2.3 2.0 0.4  -1.5 
Real Exchange Rate
II (c)  112.7  106.4  97.6 96.9 94.3 88.9 84.7 78.2 78.0 82.3 
Sources: Global Development Finance (a), World Development Indicators (b), Central Bank of Chile (c) and 
ECLAC Statistical Division (d). 
I Exports of Good & Services minus Imports of Goods & Services (in Millions of U.S. Dollars of 2000). 
II Real exchange rate index, 1986=100 a decrease in the index indicates an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
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Table 2 
Selected Indicators of External Vulnerability  
 
Colombia 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Short-term Debt/ 
External Debt (c) 
8.4  10.2 16.5 18.8 20.5 22.1 20.4 18.1 18.7 11.5 
Reserves/Total Debt (a)  28.3 39.7 45.7 42.5 37.4 34.2 34.7 31.5 26.6 23.5 
External Debt/Exports 
(a) 
181.0 166.1 167.3 172.8 178.4 182.7 199.3 201.9 224.7 277.3 
Debt Service/Exports (a)  40.9 36.3 38.8 33.8 45.3 31.7 37.3 28.7 30.8 43.5 
M2/Reserves Ratio (a)  1.6  1.1  1.1 1.4 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.7 2.7 
Current Account/GDP 
(b) 
1.3  5.6  1.8  -3.7 -4.5 -5.0 -4.9 -5.5 -5.3 -0.2 
Trade Balance
I (b)  2841.9 3804.5 1311.6  -2222.7  -5446.1 -6313.1  -5492.6  -6272.8  -4342.9  1632.3 
GDP Growth (%) (d)  4.0 2.4 3.8 5.4 5.8 5.2 2.0 3.4 0.5  -4.1 
Government Budget 
Surplus (% of GDP) (c) 
-0.7  0.2  -0.2  0.1  1.0  -0.6 -2.0 -3.1 -3.4 -5.1 
Real Exchange Rate
II(c) 132.5 128.7 118.3 112.1 100.0  98.6 92.3 82.8 86.9 96.8 
Sources: Global Development Finance (a), World Development Indicators (b), Central Bank of Colombia (c) and 
ECLAC Statistical Division (d). 
I Exports of Good & Services minus Imports of Goods & Services (in Millions of U.S. Dollars of 2000). 
II Real exchange rate index, 1994=100 a decrease in the index indicates an appreciation of the real exchange rate  43
 
Table 3 
Unit Root tests for Selected Variables 
 
  ADF-GLS test statistic   Ng-Perron test statistic 
EMBI Spread  -2.284 (**) -2.223  (**) 
Argentina Pressure 
Index 
-4.628 (***)  -4.056(***) 
Chile Pressure Index  -4.809(***)  -4.037(***) 
Colombia Pressure Index  -7.817(***)  -5.185(***) 
Mexico Pressure Index  -5.353(***)  -8.804(***) 
Junk Bond Spread  -2.198 (**)  -2.205 (**) 
World Oil Prices  -2.755(***)  -2.847(***) 
(**) Denotes significance at the 5% level and (*) significance at the 
10% level. Lag selection based on Schwartz information criterion. We 
chose to follow the sequential testing strategy proposed by Perron 















1 0.07  1.17  15.69  40.26 
2 1.23  3.25  15.54  39.50 
5 4.49  5.11  20.12  35.98 
10 5.29  6.18  20.25  34.87 
   44
 
Table 5 
Unit Root Tests for Selected Variables 
 
  ADF-GLS test statistic   Ng-Perron test statistic 
Output Gap  -10.477 (***)  -6.534 (***) 
Inflation Gap  -2.204(**) -2.136  (**) 
 Indexed Interest Rate  -2.711(***) -2.598  (***) 
Chilean Country Risk  -2.659 (***)  -2.496 (**) 
Terms of Trade  -1.879 (*)  -1.720 (*) 
Real Exchange Rate Gap  -5.487 (***)  -5.419 (***) 
(***) Denotes significance at the 1% level, (**) significance at the5% 
level and (*) significance at the 10% level. Lag selection based on 
Schwartz information criterion. A constant was included in all tests.  The 














1  1.13 17.28 1.17 
2  1.37 29.54 3.67 
5  3.01 33.69 8.87 
10 4.79  28.83  10.43 
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Table 7 
Unit Root Tests 
 
  ADF-GLS test statistic   Ng-Perron test statistic 
Output Gap  -4.170 (***)  -5.117 (***) 
Inflation   -2.413 (**) -2.546  (**) 
Colombian Country Risk  -1.241  -1.304 
Real Interest Rate  -1.620 (*)  -1.664 (*) 
Real Exchange Rate Gap  -1.743 (*)  -9.615 (***) 
(***) Denotes significance at the 1% level, (**) significance at the 5% 
level and (*) significance at the 10% level. Lag selection based on 
Schwartz information criterion. A constant was included in all tests. Once 
again, we used the Perron testing strategy. 




Percentage of Variance Associated with EMBI Shocks  
Horizon Interest 
Rate 
Country Risk  Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
1  0.00 14.31 0.70 
2  3.32 23.24 2.66 
5  7.19 20.43 7.83 
10  4.80 20.12 5.81 
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Table 9 
















1 − Δ t i   0.439 
[0.00] 
    
*
t i Δ   0.083 
[0.00] 
    
1 − Δ t URR   -0.075 
[0.01] 
    
2 − Δ t URR   0.163 
[0.00] 
    
3 − Δ t URR   -0.053 
[0.10] 





    
Q-statistic refers to the test for serial correlation of the residuals 
of the model. Normality is the Jarque-Bera test for the normality of the 
residuals in the regression. P-values for all the test statistics are 
presented in brackets.  
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Table 10 
















1 − Δ t i   0.352 
[0.00] 
    
2 − Δ t i   -0.010 
[0.90] 
    
3 − Δ t i   0.231 
[0.01] 
    
*
t i Δ   -0.050 
[0.85] 
    
1 − Δ t URR   -0.032 
[0.31] 
    
2 − Δ t URR   -0.000 
[0.98] 
    
3 − Δ t URR   0.053 
[0.09] 
    
4 − Δ t URR   -0.001 
[0.94] 
    
5 − Δ t URR   -0.073 
[0.03] 





    
Q-statistic refers to the test for serial correlation of the residuals 
of the model. Normality is the Jarque-Bera test for the normality of the 
residuals in the regression. P-values for all the test statistics are 




Unit Root Tests for Residuals in Colombian VAR 
 ADF-GLS  Ng-Perron 
EMBI Equation  -8.134 (***) -5.090  (***) 
Country Risk Equation  -2.888 (***)  -2.174 (**) 
Output Gap Equation  -2.549 (**)  -1.958 (*) 
Inflation Gap  -5.325 (***) -4.066  (***) 
Real Interest Rate  -10.496 (***)  -5.267 (***) 
Real Exchange Rate   -3.339 (***)  -2.699 (***) 
(***) Denotes significance at the 1% level (**) Denotes significance at 
5% level and (*) significance at 10% level. Lag selection based on 
Schwartz information criterion. 
 